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Recent Proposed Legislation
OHIO AND THE UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACT
THE UNIFORM Deceptive Trade Practices Act' is divided into
four main sections: definitions,2 deceptive trade practices,'
remedies,4 and exceptions.' Activities prohibited by the act fall
into three catagories: (1) palming or passing off, that is, selling
one's goods or services as those of another;' (2) disparagement of
another's goods or services;7 and (3) false advertising.' The act is
designed to insure uniformity among the states in the area of un-
fair competition and to provide injunctive relief against practices
which most of the states do not now prohibit. It is the purpose
of this comment to place the Uniform Act in historical focus as
it relates to the general law of unfair competition, to analyze the
effects its adoption would have on Ohio law, statutory or common,
and to examine some of the factors favoring or militating against
its adoption in Ohio.
Unfair competition law "is traceable to the gradual recognition
by the courts of the necessity of protecting the good will of an
enterprise and of preventing competitors from appropriating the
harvest of those who have sown."'" Since the goodwill of a busi-
ness often resides in its trademarks or tradenames"' and since the
"law of trademarks is a part of the broader law of unfair competi-
tion,"" it is necessary to review the extent to which legal protection
has been given to those areas covered by the act.
' UNIFORm DEcPTIVE TRADE PRACTicEs AT §5 1-9 [hereinafter cited as UNI-
FORM ACT]. See 54 TRADEMARK REP. 897 (1964) for the text of this act.
2 The act is reproduced in many places. For the note to the act, see Dole, Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: A Prefatory Note, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 435 (1964).
[hereinafter cited as Prefatory Note).
a UNIFORM AcT §§ 2(a)(1)-(12).
4 UNIFORM AcT §§ 3(a)-(b).
5 UNIFORM AcT §§ 4(a)(1)-(c).
6See generally 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 55 4.1,
16 .2(a) (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as CALLMAN]; 1 NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADEMARKS §§ 1-12 (4th ed. 1947).
7 See generally 2 CALLMAN §§ 39-43.3(b); 2 NIMs, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 255-
71; Note, 51 IowA L REV. 1066 (1966).
8 See generally 1 CALLMAN § 18-20.4(h); 2 NIMS, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 290-
91 (a).
9 See Prefatory Note 436-38.
10 I CALLMAN § 4.1, at 70. (Footnotes omitted.)
11 Id. § 2.2.
12 OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTIcEs 30 (2d ed. 1965).
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Originally, the doctrine of passing off only encompassed the
sale of goods or services by one man while deliberately and fraudu-
lently representing them to be those of another.13 As the doctrine
grew, it was divided into three interrelated areas: the "confusion
as to source" area, that is, deceptive labeling or packaging; the
"confusion as to product" area, that is, product simulation; and,
the "direct substitution of goods" area. 4 The leading case dealing
with source confusion was Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,'5
which caused the federal courts to develop a concept of secondary
meaning in the absence of a technical trademark.' " However, the
presence of various requirements limited the scope of the action.
These requirements were that there be actual competition between
the parties,' that actual deception of the consuming public be
shown,' 8 and that a fraudulent intent be shown.'"
By 1938 the federal courts had developed a well-defined though
narrow source confusion law. In the product confusion area, how-
ever, the courts were faced with the basic proposition that a product
in the public domain - that is, not protected by the patent or
copyright laws - could be freely copied by anyone."0  The Su-
preme Court's attempt to widen this area was ineffective,2 al-
though the courts, by developing the non-functional and secondary
meaning doctrines,2" again developed a comprehensive body of case
law.2
3
13 See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877). For a brief history see NIMS,
op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 1-5.
14 See Note, Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Effect of Sears and Compco,
50 IowA L REv. 836 (1965).
'5 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
16 See OPPENHEim, op. cit. supra note 12, at 65-67.
17 See, e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510
(7th Cir. 1912).
18 See, e.g., M. Werk Co. v. Ryan Soap Co., 14 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 122 (1911),
aff'd mem., 88 Ohio St. 539, 106 N.E. 1070 (1913).
'9 See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F.2d 555 (6th Cir. 1929).
The landmark broadening case of International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918), has not been followed. 1 CALLMAN § 4.1, at 75. But cf. Vogue
Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).20 
"The courts distinguished between functional and non-functional design features,
enjoining only the copying of non-functional features of an article which had developed
a 'secondary meaning' ... if it had come to be identified in the public's mind as origi-
nating from a given source." Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco:
A Plea for a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 56 TRADEMA K REP. 16, 23 (1966)
(this article is reprinted from 69 DICK. L. REV. 347 (1965)).
21 See cases cited note 19 supra.
22 See note 20 supra; see, e.g., Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed.
299 (2d Cir. 1917).
23 See Note, supra note 14, at 842.
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Other forms of deceptive trade practices, in addition to passing
off, are common. Examples include false or unfair advertising,
price discrimination, interference with contractual rights, trade boy-
cotts, and commercial disparagement of products.24 False advertis-
ing and disparagement are specifically forbidden by the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
25
Disparagement has its roots in the traditional right of action
at law for libel and slander, giving rise to the claim that "dispar-
agement of a competitor's goods is straight-jacketed into the all too
narrow frame of libel and slander."26  Historically, the plaintiff
was required to plead and prove traditional tort elements, namely,
publication of a false factual statement, malicious intent to cause
pecuniary loss, and special damages as a result of the defamation.
27
Although the federal courts began to enjoin such conduct early in
this century,2" it should not be assumed that any significant gains
were made.2"
The cause of action for false advertising"° was subject to many
of the same restraints as disparagement, as is evidenced by the
leading federal case of American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg.
Co.3  This restrictive view is still prevalent. 2  Injunctive relief
has been limited to situations in which the defendants advertise-
ments referred to a product on which the plaintiff had a pure and
total monopoly.3
In the source confusion area, therefore, the federal courts went
24 1 CALLMAN, § 4.1, at 74.
25 UNIFORM ACT § 2(a) (5)-(11).
26 1 CALLMAN § 4.1, at 74; see, e.g., Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y.
384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
27 Note, 51 IowA L REV. 1066, 1067 (1966). See generally id. at 1067-70; De-
velopments in the Law - Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888, 892-905 (1964);
Address by Werner Janssen, Jr., United States Trademark Ass'n Annual Meeting, May
25, 1962, in 53 TRADEMARK REP. 273 (1963).
28 See 2 CALLMAN § 39.1(d), at 698-700.
9 See International Visible Syss. Corp. v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 65 F.2d 540 (6th
Cir. 1933).
30 See generally 1 CALLMAN §§ 18-20.5; Callman, False Advertising as a Competi-
tive Tort, 48 COLuM. L. REv. 876 (1948); Developments in the Law - Competitive
Torts, 77 HAR. L. REv. 888 (1964).
3' 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
32 See California Apparel Creators v. Wieder, Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947)-
33 See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). Compare RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 761 (1939)
with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). "In no re-
ported common law case has a court gone even so far as the first Restatement position."
Developments in the Law - Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 907 (1964).
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far beyond the traditional palming off concept and developed a
body of law which held that the copying of another's product,
labeling, or dress84 in a manner likely to deceive the public85 was
illegal and entitled the injured party to both damages and an in-
junction.36
This expansion of unfair competition by the federal courts came
to an abrupt halt in 1938 with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." By the
stroke of a pen the "liberal" federal diversity cases were deprived of
binding effect in the very courts that had decided them. Federal
judges were thereafter required to apply state law whenever they
obtained jurisdiction over an unfair competition claim. The rub
was that state law had marked time during the period that federal
law was evolving.8
That such narrow prerequisites as actual competition and intent
to deceive were imposed by the states attenuated the problem,"
and the fact that whatever state law existed prior to Erie was not
uniform created further problems. In 1941, a Supreme Court deci-
sion applying Erie to conflict of laws cases worsened an already
lamentable situation. 0 To correct this state of affairs, it has often
been urged that a federal law of unfair competition be enacted.41
It has also been suggested that minor amendments to presently
existing federal statutes could accomplish this purpose.4" Proposed
bills on the subject of unfair competition have been introduced
834 See, e.g., S.S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F.2d 415 (6th Cir.
1925).
85 See, e.g., Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
36 Ibid.
87 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38 Prefatory Note 435.
39 See Note, 50 IowA L. Riv. 836 (1965).
4 0 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
41 See Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Fi-
nance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964); Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercia Activities Act, 23
OHio ST. I.J. 110 (1962); Peterson, supra note 20, at 48-49. Federal question cases
in -which unfair competition claims are joined are a different problem. Such joinder
is allowed via 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964) on the pendent jurisdiction theory. See
Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Some courts have said there now exists a
federal common law of unfair competition, while others reject this idea. Compare
Bliss v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963), with Flexitized, Inc. v.
National Flexitized Corp., 214 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Certain federal statutes
have also been interpreted by some to create a federal law. See CALLmAN § 94.3;
Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987 (1949). Com-
pare Federal-Mogul-Bearings, Inc. v. Azcoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963), with L'Aig-
Ion Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
42 Peterson, supra note 20, at 34-43.
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into the House of Representatives four times since 1959 but have
met with no success.4"
All of these factors created a situation to which the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began to de-
vote its attention in 195V' The result was the promulgation of
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act45 which has to date
been adopted in Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, and, with
modifications, Oklahoma.46 The Uniform Act, soon to be consid-
ered by the Ohio General Assembly, consists of twelve sections.
Paragraph 12 of section 2(a) covers "any other conduct which
similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstand-
ing."47  Its purpose is to allow "the courts to block out new kinds
of deceptive trade practices."" "The deceptive trade practices sin-
gled out by the Uniform Act can be roughly subdivided into con-
duct involving either misleading trade identification or false or
deceptive advertising,"49 while paragraph 12 was inserted in an
attempt to insure that the ingenuity of those who engage in decep-
tive trade practices will not result in circumvention of the purposes
of the act.
Section 3 of the act, the remedies section, provides for injunctive
relief to anyone likely to be damaged; proof of actual damage or
wrongful intent is not required.5" Section 4 excludes from the
purview of the act those actions taken in compliance with orders
"of a governmental agency, publishers or disseminators of printed
or pictorial matter who publish without knowledge . . . and acts
prior to the adoption of the statute."51
4
3Id. at 43-45.
4 4 See SEcTIoN OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS 1958 AcT 45.
45 Prefatory Note 435.
4 6 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-115(c)-(f) (Supp. 1965); 55 Del. Laws 1965,
at 92; IDAHO CODE ANN. 55 48-601 to -606 (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 ,
§§ 311-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 51-55 (Supp.
1966). For a discussion of the Oklahoma modifications, see Merrill, Oklahoma and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 36 J. OKLA. B.A.
2205 (1965). Research has revealed no cases yet decided interpreting the act in these
states.
4 7 UNIFORM Acr § 2(a)(12).
43 Comment to UNIFORM AcT S 2(a)(12).
49 Prefatory Note 436.
50 UNIFORM ACT § 3(a). Subsection 3(b) provides that a court may in its discre-
tion award costs and attorneys fees if the defendant wilfully engaged in the wrongful
conduct. Subsection 3(c) makes it dear that the remedies under the act are non-
exclusive.
51 Peterson, supra note 20, at 47.
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Certain other features of the act should be noted. Section 3(a)
provides that "relief granted for the copying of an article shall be
limited to the prevention of confusion or misunderstanding as to
source.j 52  A comment makes it dear that the purpose of the
provision is to accommodate the act with two recent Supreme Court
decisions.53 Section 3(b)" has been criticized for not allowing
recovery of profits, treble damages, or reasonable attorney's fees.55
Such criticism, however, overlooks the fact that the act is designed
primarily to protect the consumer rather than business. 6 Thus,
the act is written in terms of likelihood of confusion to the con-
sumer, defines most deceptive trade practices with reference to such
confusion, and allows any person who is "likely to be damaged by
a deceptive trade practice of another"'57 to obtain an injunction.
Moreover, the act provides that all other common law remedies
may be used in addition to the injunctive remedies of the act it-
self.58 In order to guage the impact of the act upon Ohio law, it
is necessary to ascertain the state of Ohio law in the three primary
areas covered by the proposed legislation.
In the direct substitution of goods area, the act will not affect
Ohio law. Direct substitution is the most flagrant type of passing
off and is prohibited by section 2(a) (1) of the Uniform Act. Such
activity has long been illegal in Ohio.5" Section 2(a)(1) also pro-
hibits activities in the "confusion as to product" area, such as prod-
uct simulation, since, as has been shown, passing off encompasses
the copying of an article in such a way as to lead to a likelihood
of confusion among consumers." In Brill v. Singer Mfg. Co.,6
the Ohio Supreme Court stated that "anyone may make anything
52 UNiFo~m ACT § 3(a).
5 3 Comment to UNIFORM Acr § 3(a); see Leeds, Impat of Sears and Compco, 55
TRADEMAK REP. 188, 192-93 (1965); Peterson, supra note 20, at 46-47. The two
decisions mentioned are Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
54 See note 50 supra.
55 Leeds, supra note 53, at 193.
5 6 As has been noted, no right of action exists under the act unless there is a
likelihood of consumer confusion. Since § 2 (b) of the act removes actual competition
as an element, it seems clear that the purpose of the act is to protect consumers.
57 UNIFORM AcT § 3(a).
58 UNFoRM AcT § 3(c).
59 See Rothchild's Sons' Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 12 Ohio C.C.R. 741
(Cir. Ct. 1894); Ireland v. Higginson, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 110 (C.P. 1930); Block
Light Co. v. Tappehorn, 2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 553, (QP. 1904).
60 See 1 CALLMAN § 16.2(d).
6141 Ohio St. 127 (1884).
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in any form, and may copy with exactness that which another has
produced.., unless he attributes to that which he has made a
false origin . ,." It is clear that the court was boldly declaring
that even though secondary meaning might be present and there
might be an exact copying, there would not be unfair competition
unless the labeling of the article also tended to create a likelihood
of confusion.6"
Just five years later, however, the court affirmed a decision
which went well beyond Brill.64 In affirming the issuance of an
injunction against the copying of the plaintiff's safe cabinet, the
court found secondary meaning65 and held that "any manufacturer
has the right to copy an article made by another which is not pro-
tected by patent, but he has not the right to so imitate it in shape,
design, color, and number as to deceive purchasers of average intel-
ligence ...."66 The court concluded that the copying of the de-
vice's functional aspects would result in buyers' being induced to
purchase the defendant's product as being of the plaintiff's manu-
facture.6
7
Although recent decisions have had contrary results,68 the con-
flict is probably moot in light of Tappan Co. v. General Motors
Corp.,69 wherein West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co.,7"
was cited to support the holding that copying is not unfair compe-
tition in the absence of palming off." Thus, Ohio seems to have
returned to the Brill rule, and since this rule is in accord with the
Uniform Act as interpreted previously, it is unlikely that the act
will change Ohio law.
In the "confusion as to source" area, the Uniform Act is quite
621d. at 138.
e It should be noted that Brill was criticized in French Bros. Dairy v. Giacin, 20
Ohio Dec. 638 (C.P. 1909), where the court pointed out that Brill failed "because at
that time the doctrine of unfair competition had not been fully developed." Id. at
648.
64Safe-Cabinet Co. v. Globe Wernicke Co., 3 Ohio App. 24 (1914), aff'd, 92
Ohio St. 532 (1915).
65 Id. at 27.
66 Id. at 35.
67 Id. at 32.
68 West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955);
Diebold, Inc. v. Record Files, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1955), af'd on other
grounds, 237 F.2d 527 (6th Cit. 1956).
69 245 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
70 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cit. 1955).
71 245 F. Supp. at 974.
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broad.72 Most instances of such confusion are caused by the decep-
tive labeling or dressing of goods or products. Ohio case law seems
to be firmly established in this area."
Section 2(a) (2) cases - likelihood of confusion as to source,
sponsorship, approval, or certification - are quite numerous. The
early case of Cohn v. Kahn74 stands for the proposition that the
use of another's trade name, although it is not trademarkable, is
unfair competition and may be enjoined. The leading case in the
area covered by section 2(a)(2) is Hugo Stein Cloak Co. v. S. B.
Stein & Son, Inc.,75 where the defendant was enjoined from using
his own name on his store front." The court held that "it would
make no difference whether the use of the name is accidental, inci-
dental, or intentional, if it results in misleading the public and
causes confusion .... ""
Section 2(a)(3) - likelihood of confusion as to affiliation, con-
nection or association with or certification by - also has parallel
Ohio case law. A recent Ohio Supreme Court case which allowed
injunctive relief was National City Bank v. National City Window
Cleaning Co.,78 apparently following the rationale expressed by a
district court: "The potential injury to the trade of another, or the
likelihood of confusion or mistake.., is not the only equitable con-
sideration. The larger and determining factor or issue is whether
the use made of the other's established trade name is calculated
to, and probably will, create in the public mind the belief that the
two are related . . . ."" The cases indicate that while sections
2(a)(2) and 2(a)(3) may expand Ohio's law of unfair competition,
they will not change it in any respect. No Ohio cases have been
72 UNIFORm ACT 5 2(a) (2)-(3), (5)-(7).
73 See notes 74-83 infra and accompanying text.
74 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 472 (C.P. 1882); see also Drake Medidne Co. v. Glessnier,
68 Ohio St. 337 (1903). Compare Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, Inc.,
136 F.2d 470 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 798 (1943), with . & J. Gallo Winery
v. Gallo, 87 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
75 58 Ohio App. 377, 16 N.E.2d 609 (1937). See also Henry Furnace Co. v. Kap-
pelman, 91 Ohio App. 451 (1952); Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera
Ass'n, 22 Ohio App. 400 (1926). But cf. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ohio Life Ins.
Co., 210 N.2d 298 (C.P. 1962), aff'd, 3 Ohio St. 2d 44 (1965).
76 58 Ohio App. at 385, 16 N.E.2d at 612.
77 Id. at 384, 16 N.E.2d at 612.
78 174 Ohio St. 510, 190 N.E.2d 437 (1963), affirming in pertinent part and re-
versing in part 180 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio App. 1962). See also Lippman v. Martin, 5
Ohio N.P. 120 (Super. Ct. 1898).
79 Radio Corp. of America v. R.C.A. Rubber Co., 114 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D.
Ohio 1953).
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found which would fall under section 2(a)(4) which prohibits de-
ceptive representations as to geographic origin.
Sections 2(a)(5), (6), and (7) are directed toward false or mis-
leading advertising. One Ohio case, Hagmeir v. Hulshizer,s8 seems
to fall squarely under 2(a) (7). There, the defendant circulated
advertisements that the plaintiff's first grade flour was actually sec-
ond grade. The plaintiff was allowed to recover damages although
no injunctive relief was given or requested."1 Although no cases
seem to fall under 2(a) (5) or (6), it is not unreasonable to con-
dude, first, that many of the cases which come under subparagraphs
(1), (2), and (3) of section 2(a) 2 would also be violative of sub-
paragraphs (5) and (6); and, second, that the Ohio courts would
have no difficulty in enjoining violations of these sections.8"
Section (2) (a) (8) is the disparagement provision of the Uni-
form Act, and it seems to have some decisional support in Ohio.8
4
In Yood v. Daly,"5 the defendant, a rabbi, made false representa-
tions to the effect that the goods sold in the plaintiff's store were
not kosher. In reversing the trial court's judgment sustaining the
defendant's demurrer, the Summit County Court of Appeals held
that an injunction would lie to prevent the rabbi from continuing
to make these false statements if irreparable damage were shown."8
Thus section 2(a)(8) would seem to expand the Ohio law by giving
relief on a mere showing of likelihood of confusion rather than
irreparable damage.
Section 2(a) (9) of the Uniform Act - advertising goods with
the intent not to sell them as advertised - has been enjoined at
common law in Ohio." No Ohio cases have been found which
squarely fall under the prohibitions of section 2(a) (10) - bait
advertising - or section 2 (a) ( 11) - spurious "fire" and "liquida-
tion" sales. Section 2(a) (12) of the Uniform Act - the catchall
provision - has been discussed previously.
80 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 507 (C.P. 1910).
81Id. at 510.
8 2 See cases cited notes 61, 64, 68, 74-79 supra.
83 See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
84 See International Indus. & Dev., Inc. v. Farbach Chem. Co., 241 F.2d 246 (6th
Cir. 1957); Yood v. Daly, 37 Ohio App. 574, 174 N.E. 779 (1930); Henry Gehring
Co. v. McCue, 23 Ohio App. 281, 154 N.E. 171 (1926); Hagemeier v. Hulshizer, 11
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 507 (C.P. 1910).
85 37 Ohio App. 574, 174 N.E. 779 (1930).
86ld. at 576-77, 174 N.E. at 779-80.
87 See Rothchild's Sons' Co. v. Brunswick-Bake-Collender Co., 12 Ohio C.C.R. 741
(Cir. Ct. 1894); Ireland v. Higginson, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 110 (C.P. 1930).
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Section 2(b) of the Uniform Act states that in order to prevail
in an action brought under its provisions, the plaintiff need not
prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or misun-
derstanding. While there are early cases to the contrary,88 this
provision would seem to enact no new law in Ohio."
Section 3 (a) of the act provides that suit may be brought by
any person likely to be damaged by the deceptive trade practice.
From the cases previously discussed it is dear that this will be no
innovation to Ohio law" in general, although it is certainly possi-
ble that under section 3 (a) courts may be more liberal in finding
standing to bring the suit than they have in the past. Section 3 (a)
provides that proof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent
to deceive is not required. Again, this is consistent with Ohio law. 1
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, if adopted in Ohio,
would not overturn any Ohio precedent. However, because of the
generality of the act's language, it might be construed to cover
areas of activity which have heretofore not been covered by the
common law. Because of the scarcity of precedent in some of the
areas covered by .the act, all that can be said with assurance is that
Ohio is probably more progressive than most other states, with the
possible exception of California,92 and that although the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act will expand Ohio law, it will not
alter the authority of previous Ohio judicial decisions.
The law of unfair competition today is a "morass"98 of non-
uniform state case and statutory law, federal law, and mixed con-
cepts of business ethics and legal remedies. None of the remedies
presently available adequately protect consumers from the small
or medium-sized operator who engages in deceptive trade practices.
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, by making an inexpen-
sive remedy available to one who is likely to be damaged by such
8 8 See, e.g., Plasterer v. Cross, 17 Ohio App. 265 (1922).
89 See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, Inc., 136 F.2d 470 (6th Cr.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 798 (1943).
90 See cases cited notes 74-75, 77-80, 84, 86 supra.
9 1 See, e.g., National City Bank v. National City Window Cleaning Co., 180 N.E.
2d 20 (Ct. App. 1963), aff'd in pertinent part, 174 Ohio St. 510, 190 NE.2d 437
(1963).
92 For a discussion of the California statutes and cases, see Prefatory Note 437-38.
9 3 Interview with Albert P. Sharpe II, Cleveland patent and trademark attorney,
Oct. 4, 1966.
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conduct, should offer a solution unless the courts unreasonably limit
its application. No cogent arguments against the act have been
made, and none can be foreseen; thus, it should be adopted in Ohio.
MICHAEL S. YAUCH
